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AMELIORATING THE ALLIANCE DILEMMA IN AN
AGE OF GRAY-ZONE CONFLICT
Lessons Learned from the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Michael M. Bosack

T

wo key concepts in alliance theory that remain ever relevant in practice today
are those of abandonment and entrapment. In short, whenever there is an
expectation of a military commitment, whether formal or informal, there may
be two accompanying fears. The first is that the ally will fail to meet its end of
the bargain—that it will abandon its obligations in a time of need. The second
fear is that a security commitment will draw an ally into a war it did not want
to fight; that is, it will be entrapped in conflict. These fears of abandonment and
entrapment influence alliance interactions, although their impacts on security
relationships are the source of debate among practitioners and academics alike.
These concepts, as employed in international relations studies, emerged in
the late Cold War era against the backdrop of bipolar superpower competition.1
Certainly, things have changed since the Cold War,
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an increased need for a “whole-of-government” approach to security issues that
goes beyond traditional defense sectors. At the same time, the nature and role of
alliances within competition and conflict have evolved.
From this, two problems emerge associated with collective understandings of
abandonment and entrapment. The first is the absence of a compilation of key
takeaways from scholarship, especially those that apply the two concepts to the
present security environment. But scholars have tested and refined the theories
surrounding the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment, to a degree
sufficient to warrant an update to our understanding of what they, taken in
aggregate, mean for alliances in the present day.
The second problem is the gap between scholars and practitioners in understanding abandonment and entrapment. Academia offers much toward
comprehending those issues, but applying existing scholarship is difficult, given
the absence of a study that connects it to the current strategic environment in a
practical manner. There must be a way to compile existing scholarship in a way
that is useful to practitioners.
This article seeks to remedy those problems by answering the question of
how abandonment and entrapment can affect alliance management in a modern
strategic environment marked by gray-zone conflict. To accomplish this, it first
defines alliances and explains how they function in response to security incidents
that may warrant allied response. Next the article curates notable takeaways from
the wealth of scholarship on abandonment and entrapment. Then the article explains some of the defining characteristics of the modern security environment—
specifically, the type of security incidents that affect formal alliances. From there,
it applies the aggregated theoretical takeaways to the U.S.-Japan alliance to yield
better understanding of how abandonment and entrapment influence alliance
interactions.
This examination is important for academics and practitioners alike. It
aggregates seven key takeaways from existing literature on the concepts of
abandonment and entrapment. The article also posits that in the age of gray-zone
conflict adversaries can undermine alliance relationships without reaching the
threshold to trigger an alliance response. It further highlights that the influences
on traditional military alliances of diplomatic, information, and economic
instruments of power have increased. Those factors reveal that although alliances
formed in the Cold War era have succeeded in deterring interstate military
disputes, adversaries are seeking means of changing the status quo through
security incidents short of an armed attack. This means that designs predicated
on response to armed attack and focused primarily on military guarantees must
be adapted to meet the needs of the modern strategic environment. There are
examples of how alliances are adapting, and this article offers one in the form
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
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of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its employment of the negotiated “Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” to prepare seamless responses to gray-zone
threats.4
There are limits to this examination. First, the article focuses on formal alliances that contain an obligation for the use of military force in support of one or
more parties to a security relationship. In other words, the focus is on alliances
codified by an international treaty that includes a military guarantee. This is
necessary for a couple of reasons. Treaty alliances are recognized under international law, so decision-making related to those formal instruments has important
institutional and reputational impacts.5 It will be important for future studies to
examine alignments as opposed to alliances, but that is not the aim of this article.6
Also, the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment are not uniformly applicable across neutrality, nonaggression, and consultation pacts as well, even
though some alliance scholars prefer to include those types in their examinations
of alliance reliability.
The second boundary is that this article focuses only on the present security
environment. While some conclusions detailed here feasibly could apply to other
eras of conflict, the article makes no claims of universal applicability.
Finally, the case study focuses on a bilateral alliance to minimize variables in
understanding how the fears of abandonment and entrapment operate within an
alliance relationship. However, the arguments made here open the door to applying them in future examinations of multilateral alliances.
DEFINING ALLIANCES AND HOW THEY FUNCTION IN PRACTICE
To understand abandonment and entrapment from a practical perspective, one
first must define an alliance clearly, since scholars and practitioners alike disagree
on the subject. For the sake of clarity, this article focuses on treaty alliances that
contain a formal obligation for the use of military force in support of one or
more allies. This use of force occurs when a certain threshold is met—the casus
foederis.
In many alliances, some rights and obligations apply even in the absence of
security conflict. This article refers to these as peacetime trade-offs. Such tradeoffs may include basing rights, security assistance, intelligence sharing, peacetime
military training, and transfer of defense technology. They are privileges and
obligations that distinguish allies from nonallies, even in the absence of conflict.
Still, at the core of any alliance are the casus foederis and the obligation for one
or more allies to use military force in support of another. The obligation kicks in
to use military force or to provide certain exceptional rights and privileges for
the purpose of responding to military conflict following a security incident. A
security incident is any event that has the potential for triggering the casus foederis
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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(i.e., when the threshold for alliance response is reached). The incident can be
offensive or defensive in nature, meaning an ally can initiate it (such as by carrying out a preemptive strike against an adversary) or it can be reactive (such as
responding to an armed attack against an ally).
This is the point at which the potential for abandonment or entrapment comes
into play. The state involved in the security incident must decide whether to
invoke alliance obligations, and the ally (or allies) then must decide whether to
answer the call. If the state involved in the security incident decides not to invoke
the casus foederis, the alliance continues with normal peacetime trade-offs. If
the state does invoke it, there are four potential outcomes. First, an ally could
recognize the validity of the casus foederis but choose not to meet its obligations.
This constitutes abandonment. Second, the ally could argue that the security
incident does not meet the threshold for alliance response, and elect not to meet
the obligations expected. This is more nuanced, but ultimately represents a form
of abandonment, at least in the eyes of the ally invoking the casus foederis. Third,
the ally could engage in a conflict it does not want to fight, which would constitute
a form of entrapment.7 Fourth, the ally could answer the call unreservedly.
There are two takeaways from this. First, the casus foederis is important from a
practical perspective, because it is what a state uses to prompt its allies to provide
obligations that go beyond peacetime trade-offs. Second, there is no such thing as
an ironclad alliance guarantee or an automatic alliance response; there are always
the questions whether the casus foederis should be invoked and whether an ally
should answer the call.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM SCHOLARSHIP
Beginning in earnest in the 1980s and continuing since then, scholars have been
trying to define how the fears of abandonment and entrapment shape alliance
politics. This article summarizes relevant alliance literature from the intervening
decades and curates conclusions with a practical view in mind. There are seven
key takeaways.
1. Alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict. Scholars have
demonstrated that the formation of alliances contributes to a decreased
likelihood of military conflict among states, for various reasons.8 Not
only does this bear on the risk of entrapment, but it highlights an issue
for present-day security. Naturally, a decreased risk of military conflict
means less risk of becoming involved in war. However, it does not mean
that security competition among states ceases altogether, so in the context
of the modern strategic environment it suggests that adversaries will
compete in other ways and using instruments of power that do not result
in open military conflict.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5

4

Bosack: Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict

B OSACK

49

2. Risk of entrapment is low. Although some academics and practitioners
still support the notion that entrapment is a major risk for allies, newer
research compellingly argues that entrapment is a narrower concept than
previously discussed and not as prevalent as once thought.9 The narrow
scope of entrapment and the fact that states design alliances to minimize
the risk of entrapment mean that the possibility of being pulled into a
conflict that a state did not want to fight in the first place is low. In the
context of the modern strategic environment, this means that, while fear
of entrapment still impacts alliance politics, it often is inflated, and the
problem typically lies in the irrationality of one or more leaders within the
alliance-management framework.
3. Alliance designs matter in managing the risks of abandonment and
entrapment. States that enter formal alliances negotiate treaties in ways
that seek to maximize their interests while minimizing their costs. As part
of minimizing costs, leaders anticipate the possibility of entrapment and
carefully design alliance agreements accordingly, or they avoid entering
into alliances in the first place.10 The explicitness of the designs and the
language employed in alliance agreements help clarify arrangements and
thereby reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment.11 Additionally,
alliance literature demonstrates that a state can leverage alliance designs
to influence its partner’s behavior. Those designs can be employed in
shaping the direction of a state’s military buildup, can influence foreign
policy decisions, and can be used in restraining potentially risky behavior,
among other things.12 The important point here is that alliance designs
matter significantly in managing abandonment and entrapment, which
means that alteration of those alliance designs can be an active tool in
alliance management for influencing those risks.
4. Alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into abandonment
and entrapment issues. In some alliances, a state cedes autonomy to a
militarily superior ally or allies—a key trade-off, especially in asymmetric
alliances in which only one member offers a guarantee for the use of
military force.13 Other trade-offs may include the provision of bases,
cost sharing (for the stationing of foreign forces), economic concessions,
public support for the ally’s policies, and coordination of foreign policy.14
The presence of nonmilitary benefits means that abandonment may not
be an issue of a failure to employ military force against an adversary;
rather, it simply may be a failure to provide some contribution that
is necessary for a state to achieve its security objectives following a
triggering of the casus foederis. Regarding entrapment, the provision of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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nonmilitary objects still may present a risk of being drawn into conflict,
the most obvious example being provision of bases for an ally’s military
forces.15 What this means for scholars and practitioners is that one
cannot overlook the risk of abandonment of nonmilitary contributions,
as well as the entrapment risk that is associated with provision of those
contributions. It also suggests that competition short of armed conflict
increases the importance of nonmilitary aspects of alliance rights and
obligations.
5. Risk of abandonment increases over time because alliance treaties remain
static, while other factors do not. Scholars have established that changes
in political administrations, age structures, and threats, among other
factors, all can affect alliance reliability.16 The simple fact is that an
alliance agreement, unless renegotiated or clarified through implementing
instruments, is static, while other variables are dynamic. Over time, this
could introduce gaps where alliance designs fail to meet particular threats
or where new expectations emerge that are not codified formally within
agreed-upon obligations.17 What this means for the present strategic
environment is that alliances that are not updated, through either
renegotiation of the treaty or the provision of clarifying instruments, may
be outmoded. Allies who fail to manage their core arrangements could be
unwittingly allowing the risk of abandonment to grow.
6. Adversaries attempt to undermine alliances, divide allies, or both. Existing
literature demonstrates that even as allies seek to manage the risks of
abandonment and entrapment, adversaries seek to undermine or break
up alliance relationships.18 In other words, adversaries actively work to
increase the risk of abandonment. They have attempted to exploit seams
in alliances and will continue to do so, especially in ways that lead to
ineffectual responses to security incidents.
7. Allies can take steps to reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment. Since
alliance designs can manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment,
since allies have the ability to influence partners through those designs,
and since circumstances change over time, there are steps allies can
take to reduce abandonment and entrapment risks. In the context of the
present strategic environment, allies can seek to alter alliance designs to
reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment. Allies then can leverage
those designs in attempting to influence their allies’ behavior. They can
do this through renegotiation of the alliance treaty or the creation of
clarifying instruments.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
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ALLIANCES IN THE MODERN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
This section characterizes the modern strategic environment in the context of
security alliances that incorporate both peacetime trade-offs and obligations
that follow invocation of the casus foederis. As previously noted, alliances tend
to deter militarized disputes, but they do not eliminate security competition
altogether. States seeking to change the status quo simply have looked for
methods to achieve their goals without overtly violating international law and
thereby prompting responses from the international community, especially by
allies of the offended state.19 In circumventing international law, some states have
sought to act in new domains to achieve their interests, especially the cyberspace
domain.20 They also use nonmilitary instruments of power.21 This has made Cold
War–era alliance designs outmoded, since those were predicated on a military
response to an armed attack in conventional domains of conflict (land, air, and
sea). Outmoded alliance designs create seams within security relationships that
adversaries actively seek to exploit. Fortunately, there are ways allies can adapt.
The current liberal international order is predicated on the United Nations
system, which built on customary international law and institutions and reshaped
many of the rules of interaction among states.22 The central tenet related to security and defense is found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, specifically article 51,
which states as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”23 In principle, postwar
alliance agreements are founded on this definition of conflict, in which the security guarantees inherent in those alliances are based on “collective self-defence”
to be exercised in the event of an “armed attack.”24
What is an armed attack? The UN Charter does not offer a clearer explanation,
but the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in Nicaragua v. United
States does.25 Stated plainly, the court held that an armed attack is an armed
incursion into another state’s sovereign territory attributable to a specific member
of the international community. It further clarified that, even in the event of an
armed-attack situation, a UN member state is not permitted to exercise collective
self-defense until the state under attack has declared the occurrence of an armed
attack and has requested support.
Thus, an armed-attack situation is the threshold for collective self-defense
under international law and it fulfills the casus foederis for many alliance relationships; however, there are many types of security incidents that may occur prior
to an armed attack. Some of these are depicted in the figure, arranged by level of
intensity and impetus for response.26
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SECURITY INCIDENTS, FROM PEACETIME TO “ARMED ATTACK”

Impetus for Response
Armed Attack
Loss of Life
Impact to Sovereign Territory
(damage to personnel or property)
Impact to Sovereign Territory (no damage
to personnel or property)
WMD-Related Activity
Violation of International Law / Sanctioned Activity
Violation of Domestic Interpretation of International Law

Level of Intensity

Violations of domestic interpretation of international law are incidents that
a state may view as legal violations but that do not necessarily comport with
internationally accepted legal interpretations. For example, Japan recognizes
only five of its maritime straits as constituting international passages, whereas
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) maintains that any strait
can be navigated under the right of innocent passage.27 If Japan were to respond
militarily to the transit of Chinese naval vessels through a strait that it does not
recognize as an international passage, this action would be based on a domestic interpretation of international law, and therefore would not necessarily fall
within the scope of alliance agreements.
Violations of international law or sanctioned activities may include situations
such as illegal arms transfers, piracy, and state sponsorship of terrorist
organizations.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)–related activities are any that involve
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Examples include North Korean
nuclear testing and the illicit transfer of WMD assets and technologies.
Incidents with impact to sovereign territory but dealing no damage to personnel
or property could include a territorial incursion short of an armed attack (e.g.,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
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nonmilitary personnel landing on an uninhabited island) or a failed missile test
from which debris lands in an empty field.
Security incidents with impact to sovereign territory that includes damage
to personnel or property represent the next level of intensity. In the missile-test
example, debris from a failed missile might fall on a housing area or in a commercial zone. Another relevant example is a cyber attack that disrupts a state’s
critical infrastructure.
The next level up includes any of those incidents that result in loss of life.
All those security incidents could occur before reaching the level of an armed
attack—the traditional casus foederis and international legal threshold for individual and collective self-defense. The space where security incidents occur
before an armed attack often is referred to as the gray zone.
Two types of gray-zone conflict have become prevalent in the present security
environment: lawfare and hybrid warfare. Lawfare is the “strategy of using—or
misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”28 In other words, it is the misuse of customary international
law and UN-sponsored judicial systems to achieve strategic military or political
ends. An example is Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea. Even
though international tribunals have sided with other countries (e.g., the arbitral
tribunal’s 2016 ruling in Philippines v. China), China has managed to expand its
foothold by constructing man-made islands and conducting coercive engagements in the region.29
Hybrid warfare is the “synchronized use of multiple instruments of power
tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions
to achieve synergistic effects.”30 A key feature of hybrid warfare is that it often is
nonattributable, thereby avoiding international legal thresholds for any broad
response involving the use of military force.31 Russia provides the best example
of this threat, with its employment of cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns,
“volunteer” military forces, and other activities, all of which contributed to the
annexation of Crimea and pose an ever-present threat to NATO allies.32
Through gray-zone conflict, an adversary can challenge the status quo without
reaching the level of an armed attack, meaning that there is no clear impetus for
the use of military force for individual or collective self-defense in response. Yet
security incidents that contribute to changes in the status quo are likely to warrant expectations for response from a state and its allies.33
This tells us three things. First, traditional alliance relationships focused
solely on military trade-offs are inadequate for meeting contemporary security
challenges. Certainly, militaries are the principal actors in the execution of war,
but what about when conventional interstate warfare no longer is the primary
form of interstate security conflict in the world, as is the case today? Given the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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costs associated with militarized disputes, adversaries have incentives to employ
alternative instruments of power in their attempts to further their interests. Thus
it is no longer practical to treat alliances as principally military in nature, because
doing so privileges military responses, perhaps leaving other options for security
arrangements and activities unexplored or ignored.
Second, legal foundations that have not been updated to address evolving
security challenges create seams between allies. Conventional security guarantees
are predicated on the notion of interstate defense. When the term defense is not
clarified in formal or informal agreements, its definition defaults to customary
international law (as represented in the UN Charter and the ICJ ruling, as detailed
earlier). This does not prevent a state from acting in support of an ally without
an armed-attack declaration, but the absence of an armed-attack situation creates
ambiguity that increases the risk of abandonment within alliance relationships.
Third, adversaries can exploit those seams. Through lawfare and hybrid
warfare, adversaries can take actions up to but not exceeding the threshold of
an armed attack without triggering an alliance response.34 Since adversaries can
“make plays” in the gray zone, security relationships that have not been updated
to provide strategic and operational clarity are exploitable, and again the risk of
abandonment increases.
Fortunately, there are ways for allies to adapt. As the literature survey highlighted, alliance designs have a profound effect on the risks of abandonment and
entrapment, meaning that instruments that update, amend, or clarify alliance
designs are likely to help eliminate seams in security relationships. Two key features of these instruments should be formality and publication, since those have
institutional and reputational effects while signaling commitments to potential
adversaries.35
Given this, the simplest solution is renegotiation of the alliance treaty itself.
However, since treaty language typically is vague and not directed at specific
adversaries or security situations, a more practical solution is the creation or
renegotiation of clarifying instruments under the alliance treaty. Clarifying
instruments include exchanges of notes, agreements, memorandums, and other
formally negotiated documents. A variety of informal means of clarification,
such as joint statements, also exist, but those lack the institutional or reputational
checks that negotiated instruments provide.
CASE STUDY: THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The U.S.-Japan alliance offers a prime case study for the consideration of
abandonment and entrapment. It is bilateral, meaning that there are only two
parties to the alliance agreement, which eliminates variables present in the case
of multilateral alliances. The alliance was formed in the Cold War era, meaning
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
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the treaty explicitly calls for response to an “armed attack,” with a focus on
military guarantees. Further, it is an operative alliance, meaning the rights and
obligations are still meaningfully in play today.36 The alliance is asymmetric, in
that one ally—in this case, Japan—receives a security guarantee, while the other
receives separate, nonmilitary benefits in return.37 Most importantly, there are
clear examples of the occurrence of abandonment and entrapment fears, as well
as an instance in which the allies responded to them.
The fears of abandonment and entrapment weighed heavily on alliance management for the United States and Japan in the early 2010s. In two scenarios in
particular those fears affected alliance politics: the Korean Peninsula crisis and
the defense of the Senkaku Islands.
The Korean Peninsula Crisis
The 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis and the missile launches of the late
1990s reawakened the U.S.-Japan alliance to the threat the Kim regime posed.38
For Japan, the fear of entrapment was no theoretical matter. The United States
already had used Japan as a rear-support base of operations during the Korean
War; that involvement had contributed to Japan’s desire for inclusion of a “prior
consultation” requirement in the renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty in
1960.39 Since then, the North Koreans have demonstrated missile technology
capable of reaching Japanese territory.40 With a demonstrated threat from North
Korea that included the potential for Japan to be drawn into a conflict on the
Korean Peninsula with nuclear consequences, the preexisting fear of entrapment
was renewed.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government had fears on the opposite end of the spectrum,
worrying that Japan might abandon its treaty obligations in the event of a crisis or
contingency on the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government gave U.S. officials
cause for concern in 2010 following the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and the shelling
of Yeonpyeong-do.41 In each of those situations, personnel from Headquarters,
U.S. Forces, Japan requested activation of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism
(BCM), but each time they were rebuffed because there had been no political
declaration of a Nihon Shūen Jitai (situation in area surrounding Japan, or SIASJ).42
Without activation of the BCM, U.S. officials were skeptical that they could garner
the necessary Japanese interagency support for U.S. operations in response to those
security incidents, should de-escalation efforts fail.43
The Japanese government further reinforced this concern with its treatment
of the “prior consultation” requirement. There long had been a debate within
the U.S. government regarding whether the requirement simply meant
“consultation” or it implied that “consent” from the Japanese government was
necessary.44 During a parliamentary committee meeting on 15 July 2014, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe offered his government’s position on the matter, stating that
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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Okinawa-based U.S. Marines would not deploy to support Korean contingency
operations without Japanese government consent.45 This served as a strong signal
to the United States that it might not receive the level of support it had expected
in responding to security situations on the Korean Peninsula.
If not guaranteed military support, what sort of assistance does the United
States expect? The Mutual Security Treaty and its associated status of forces
agreement legally afford the U.S. government access to all Japanese air- and
seaports and permit free transit through and across Japanese territory.46 There
also are arrangements for the support of logistical, medical, and billeting needs
for military personnel, civilian officials, and noncombatants; the list goes on.
However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense do
not have purview over civilian authorities or organizations. Therefore, execution
of alliance obligations following those security incidents would have required
interagency coordination and exceptional authorization from the Japanese
cabinet in the context of a SIASJ—something the Japanese government was not
prepared to perform in 2010.
Defense of the Senkaku Islands
The Senkaku Islands are a group of small, uninhabited land features located
along the first island chain, and are the focus of territorial disputes among Japan,
China, and Taiwan. The Senkakus have been under Japanese administration
since U.S. reversion of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, but China and Taiwan both
have laid sovereignty claims to the islands.47 While Japan has worked out and
maintained exceptional fishing agreements with Taiwan for activity in the waters
surrounding the islands, the PRC’s China Coast Guard (CCG), fishing, and
(occasionally) military vessels have operated in the vicinity of the islands for
years, especially following the Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkakus
from private Japanese landowners in 2012.48
When the Japanese government nationalized the Senkakus and tensions grew,
it introduced fears of both abandonment and entrapment within the U.S.-Japan
alliance. For Japan, there was a fear that the United States would not respond if
the Chinese seized the islands by force. For the United States, the fear was that
explicit security guarantees would increase Japanese adventurism; that is, Japan
would be more emboldened in its responses to Chinese activity in the vicinity of
the Senkakus, which might drag the United States into a war with China.
But the issue was even more nuanced than those basic fears might suggest.
The question emerged of what would happen if a paramilitary group landed on
the islands.49 If Japan could not declare an armed-attack situation, what authority
would the U.S. military have to provide collective self-defense in support of its
ally? What if there were a clash between coast guards, not militaries? Would the
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U.S. Navy have any authority to get involved if the dispute were between lawenforcement entities? What if the CCG vessel capabilities were equivalent to
those of naval forces?50
While some dispute the nature of Chinese intentions in the East China Sea, the
Japanese government’s assessment is clear.51 Chinese activity in the vicinity of the
Senkakus aims to create a situation of “coadministration” rather than Japanese
sole administration of the islands and their surrounding waters. From there,
China could make a play for sole administration. The Chinese use of gray-zone
tactics around the Senkakus is a clear example of seeking to change the status quo
without triggering a militarized dispute under international law, and gray-zone
tactics that fail to trigger the casus foederis increase the risk of abandonment.
The Alliance Response: The “2015 Guidelines”
After and while dealing with this pair of scenarios, the two allies in question
addressed their fears of abandonment and entrapment, and pursued other goals,
through renegotiation of the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.”
The guidelines are a bilaterally agreed-upon framework of alliance roles,
missions, and capabilities (RMCs). They are not a direct supplement to the
existing alliance treaty; instead, the guidelines exist as a separate implementation
framework dependent on each nation’s own laws. There have been only three
versions of the guidelines in the nearly seventy-year history of the alliance, those
of 1978, 1997, and 2015.
More than simply providing a road map for cooperation, the guidelines represent a de facto clarification of the casus foederis. They reorient the alliance for
different threats, clarify core values, and manage expectations for when and how
the allies will apply their respective capabilities in response to both peacetime
conditions and security situations.52 In places the content of the guidelines is aspirational; in others it serves as a starting point for the allies to initiate a new RMC;
in still others it formalizes initiatives already under way. Whatever the case, once
published the guidelines provide a constant point of reference for the allies, as
illustrated by the repeated references to them in joint statements at all levels of
alliance management, but most notably by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
Committee.53
The “2015 Guidelines” dealt with the fears of entrapment and abandonment
in the following four ways. First, the document explicitly defined the role of
the alliance in all situations, from peacetime through armed attack. For the
allies, an armed-attack situation is the explicit casus foederis under article 5 of
the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation.54 With the “2015
Guidelines,” the allies formally broadened the casus foederis to include grayzone threats as well, calling for “seamless responses,” highlighting the need for
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whole-of-government approaches to security issues, and identifying categories of
security incidents that require alliance response.55 Those categories of cooperation
include “Cooperative Measures from Peacetime,” “Responses to Emerging
Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security,” “Action in Response to an Armed Attack
against Japan,” “Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country Other
Than Japan,” “Cooperation in Response to Large-Scale Disaster in Japan,” and
“Cooperation in International Activities.”56
Second, the guidelines called for establishment of the Alliance Coordination
Mechanism (ACM).57 There are three reasons the U.S.-Japan alliance requires a
coordination mechanism. The first is the necessity to manage policy decisions that
affect the alliance in times of crisis or contingency.58 The second is the operational
coordination that must occur among separate organizations, given the alliance’s
bilateral structure, as opposed to a combined-forces structure.59 The third reason—which is not stated explicitly, but lies at the core of the purpose for the coordination mechanism—is to manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment.
The Mutual Security Treaty establishes specific rights and obligations, and the
ACM helps ensure that the allies honor their commitments. For example, if there
were to be a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. government would use the
ACM to provide the entire Japanese interagency structure with the information
and requests for support needed to be able to ensure provision of necessary access and support codified under alliance designs. These could include garnering
Japanese civilian and defense logistics support for an operation or the opening up
of Japanese civilian airports for use as intermediate staging bases and safe havens
for noncombatant evacuees. Conversely, the Japanese government might use the
ACM to ensure that it influences U.S. decision-making and gets its say before the
United States attempts to take potentially escalatory actions that could lead to
retaliation against bases in Japan, thereby entrapping Japan in conflict.
Third, the guidelines expanded the domains within which the allies may cooperate. As part of the desire to prepare to provide seamless responses to security
threats, the two governments decided to broaden alliance responsibilities beyond
the air, land, and sea domains, to include space and cyberspace. For the United
States, space and cyber had been recognized domains for security operations for
some time, but the same was not true of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).60
Hampered in part by budget restraints, the JSDF did not have its first military-use
satellite in orbit until 2017, and its first cyber unit did not stand up until 2014.61
The “2015 Guidelines” capitalized on Japan’s unilateral expansion in those domains to incorporate alliance cooperation.
Fourth, the “2015 Guidelines” expanded the reach of the alliance to the whole
of government. Previous iterations of the guidelines focused on foreign policy
and defense organizations, but the “2015 Guidelines” recognized the challenges
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
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of gray-zone conflict and sought to incorporate law-enforcement and other organizations that wield nonmilitary instruments of power. While the guidelines
did not succeed in incorporating an explicit call for cooperation with the Japan
Coast Guard, National Police Agency, Ministry of Finance, or others, they were
included under the scope of “relevant agencies.”62 Similarly, the guidelines called
for cooperation with civilian authorities for the conduct of site surveys necessary
to prepare for U.S. contingency operations, such as those that may occur on the
Korean Peninsula.63
How have the guidelines done in managing entrapment and abandonment?
Since publication of the “2015 Guidelines,” the two governments have employed
the ACM in response to numerous North Korean provocations, coordinating
alliance responses and exchanging information on the incidents.64 The U.S. military has conducted site surveys at multiple civilian airports in preparation for
potential contingency operations. Meanwhile, while much of the intra-alliance
discourse on the Senkakus is classified, U.S. officials have reiterated the security
guarantee over the islands while supporting development of the Japan Ground
Self-Defense Force’s amphibious brigade and continuing bilateral training on
missions specifically tailored to remote-island defense.65 All of this demonstrates
the effectiveness of the guidelines in updating the alliance for the modern strategic environment, since they redefined the casus foederis, provided a list of applicable RMCs, declared mechanisms for managing them, and presented a road
map for implementation.
The fears of abandonment and entrapment continue to influence alliance relationships today. Scholarship offers seven key takeaways for academics and practitioners alike. First, alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict, which
decreases the risk of warfare for alliance members but suggests that adversaries
will compete in ways short of military conflict. Second, the risk of entrapment is
low, although individual leaders within alliance management may inflate this risk
in intra-alliance bargaining. Third, alliance designs matter in managing the risks
of abandonment and entrapment. States carefully craft alliances to mitigate the
chance of being abandoned or entrapped, and once the security relationship is
formed they leverage alliance designs to support their desired security outcomes.
Fourth, those alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into abandonment and entrapment issues. States are concerned with what the fulfillment
or nonfulfillment of those obligations may mean for their own security objectives.
Fifth, risk of abandonment increases over time because societies, administrations,
and expectations change but alliance designs do not—unless the allies deliberately
take steps to modify them. Sixth, adversaries attempt to undermine alliances,
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divide the allies, or both, which increases the risk of abandonment. Seventh, allies
can take steps to reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment through renegotiation or clarification of alliance designs.
Understanding these takeaways is necessary for determining what posture allies should take in the modern strategic environment. Alliances have worked well
in deterring armed-attack situations, but adversaries intentionally are avoiding
the thresholds for military conflict while seeking to change the status quo in their
favor through gray-zone tactics. Alliance designs that have not been reworked to
respond to security incidents short of an armed attack require updating. Fortunately, there are examples of allies that have taken the necessary steps to modify
alliance arrangements for present-day security challenges, including expanding
the casus foederis beyond armed-attack situations, incorporating new domains
for cooperation such as space and cyberspace, and focusing on coordinated
employment of nonmilitary instruments of power. The U.S.-Japan “2015 Guidelines” document provides a useful model for other alliances today.
While this article offers useful conclusions for academics and practitioners
alike, additional research is necessary. First, the conclusions drawn here should
be applied to case studies in alignments rather than alliances. There has been a
decline in usage of traditional treaty alliances and a rise in alignments, and initial
impressions are that abandonment fears will increase as a result, since the resulting
obligations are not explicit, merely implicit.66 Second, additional research is necessary for examining abandonment and entrapment in multilateral as opposed to
bilateral alliances. For example, how do those risks influence alliance management
in NATO compared with the U.S.-Japan alliance? Finally, more research should
be dedicated to understanding the tools that allies have to mitigate the risks of
abandonment and entrapment. This article offered one example—the “Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation”—but other institutions and instruments are
available, demonstrating varying degrees of effectiveness.67
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